If I can, let me hold a mirror to the science itself. Does this “incivile segmentation” affect faculty, not only in politics, but also in schools of thought? As far as politics is concerned, I have observed a somewhat exaggerated reaction from academics to the Trump election, so much so that there are regular “Tourette`s Syndrome” oaths on the current political landscape that seems stronger than the past. It is almost as if there were “two-minute hate sessions” to deduce from meetings that have nothing to do with the current political landscape. And those who don`t walk the line jump right away. This “furious” phenomenon encompasses many of those who are supposed to analyze the political landscape in a professional (passionate) way. But do we do it? The social science profession seems to be approaching the Trump administration as a great outlier (several above-average standard deviations), but has anyone asked if the government is really so “far away”? In short, does Professor Mason, who is studying in the political world, also have an impact on the profession in which the analysis is conducted? I have exactly the same observations. I am a European who sometimes tries to follow American politics. I try to get a more objective picture by reading different sites: I read a conservative site (National Review), one on the left (Salon.com) and one that has articles on both sides (New York Times, although it seems rather left). I`ve read in salon.com articles full of hatred for whites, men, Trump voters, etc. I have never read such a noise of hate in the National Review. Yes, the left is increasingly positive about socialism and is trying to embellish the crimes of the communists, whereas I have not noticed anything similar with regard to the right and the Nazis. Antifa is violent and I don`t see a group of violence comparable to the right.
Language restrictions, campus protests, bans on intervening, firing people for false thoughts, all these undemocratic and non-wild things are mostly left-wing. … Hatred and anger, as well as the absence of positive intergroup feelings and moral guilt or shame, can be a significant obstacle to both the type of interest-based agreements that would benefit all parties involved and the types of relationship development programs that can humanize opponents and create the confidence to reach broader agreements. Indeed, trying to obtain such an agreement by carefully producing effective concessions without worrying about relational barriers can be an exercise in vain. – Kahn et al. (2016) At the beginning of the book, the author contains a chapter that states that the funds are justified at the end. It is necessary, because much of what he recommends is “unzivil” and a little misleading. He refers, for example, later, to when some members of his team question the ethics of personally attacking a “good” man who obstructed a particular policy they were defending. In a separate section of the book, he states that you must characterize your enemies in an extreme way to mobilize your followers (z.B. Nazis, racists), even if your differences are not so great. Otherwise, people will not be motivated to take the necessary steps to make changes.
He notes that some team members will not understand if you negotiate a solution later with people you have already demonized. In the section on tactics, he says, “In a fight, almost everything is fine.” And of course, its thirteenth rule is: “Choose the target, freeze it, customize it and polarize it.” We see that this is often the case now. “Political polarization in America is at a record high and the conflict has propelled itself beyond differences of opinion on political issues. We have all this socio-psychological literature that talks about intergroup conflicts, and almost none of this is in disagreement.